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MITIGATING THE LEGAL RISKS FOR LANDLORDS




Public housing units are deteriorating while there are insufficient allocations
for their renovation or maintenance. In 2012, Congress initiated the Rental
Assistance Demonstration (“RAD”) in an attempt to save public housing
without the need to apportion additional funds to housing assistance pro-
grams. The RAD program converts public housing to mixed-income housing
and transfers majority ownership to private developers. Current tenants of
these public housing complexes are transferred to mixed-income apartment
complexes owned by private landlords and developers who receive a portion
of the rent from the tenant and additional rent from the local Public Housing
Authority. The success of the RAD program is dependent on landlords and
developers voluntarily participating and electing to dedicate units to afforda-
ble housing. This Comment discusses the legal exposures these landlords face
when participating in RAD, methods of mitigating these risks, and policies to
incentivize participation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Public housing is in crisis as aging housing units are lost to deterio-
ration. In response, Congress implemented the Rental Assistance
Demonstration (“RAD”) program, which allows for a portion of cer-
tain public housing units’ ownership to be transferred to private devel-
opers.1 During some rehabilitation and construction projects, tenants
continue to reside within the same housing complex.2 In other cases, it
is necessary for tenants to relocate to mixed-income housing com-
plexes using one of two voucher systems through a process called
transfer of assistance.3 The success of this program, and public hous-
ing in general, relies on the willingness of private landlords to partici-
pate in these voucher programs and house public housing tenants.
Many landlords are hesitant to accept housing assistance vouchers due
to the unique legal exposures participation may create. Rural commu-
nities and areas in which development costs are high are seeing little
to no participation in RAD because of the inability to attract inves-
tors.4 By mitigating legal risks, the program attracts more investments.




4. ECONOMETRICA, INC., INTERIM REPORT: EVALUATION OF HUD’S RENTAL
ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION 175 (Sept. 2016).
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The first section of this Comment discusses the importance of public
housing on the economy and households receiving assistance. The sec-
ond section provides a description of the Rental Assistance Demon-
stration program. Finally, the third and fourth sections discuss the
legal exposures deterring landlord participation and suggest polices
that will mitigate these risks and encourage landlord participation.
II. PUBLIC HOUSING OVERVIEW
Currently, a total of five million individuals receive some type of
housing assistance,5 with 2.3 million of those individuals living in pub-
lic housing.6 The need for rental assistance is increasing as the United
States faces a 7.4 million unit shortage of affordable housing units.7
However, many developers are continuously choosing to construct
luxury homes over affordable housing due to the higher profit margin
luxury home development offers.8 With only an average of twenty-
eight affordable units available for every one hundred extremely low-
income households, more households are in need of rental assistance
to bridge the gap between what they can afford and what is available.9
Public housing is not only beneficial to the households receiving
subsidies, but it benefits the community as well.10 Ninety percent of
households living in public housing were “elderly, had disabilities,
worked, had recently worked, or were subject to work requirements
through another program,” with 52% of households in public housing
being elderly or disabled.11 Public housing prevents these individuals
from transitioning into state funded assisted living or nursing homes
earlier than necessary.12 Assisted living and nursing homes cost the
states significantly more money than public housing or rental assis-
5. Reuters, Out in the Cold: New U.S. Budget Priorities Threaten Housing Aid
Programs, FORTUNE (Mar. 5, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/03/05/trump-hud-hous-
ing-assistance/ [https://perma.cc/KYK7-BUNL] (discussing that housing assistance in-
cludes tenant vouchers, subsidies to landlords, and grants for housing projects).
6. Jamie Alison Lee, Rights at Risk in Privatized Public Housing, 50 TULSA L.
REV. 759, 763 (2015).
7. NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., OUT OF REACH 2017: THE HIGH COST OF
HOUSING 5 (2017).
8. See Neal Hefferren, A Complete Guide to the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
Program, PROP. METRICS (June 13, 2017), https://www.propertymetrics.com/blog/
2017/06/13/a-complete-guide-to-the-low-income-housing-tax-credit-program/ [https://
perma.cc/U3YH-WPX8].
9. Affordable Housing Statistics, MONROE GROUP, http://www.monroegroup
.com/about-us/affordable-housing-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/HBN3-CMCX] (last vis-
ited Feb. 21, 2019).
10. Letter from Flora Brewer, Researcher, N. Tex. Reg’l Hous. Assessment, to
Vice President Assisted Hous., Fort Worth Hous. Sols. (May 8, 2017) (on file with
author).
11. Policy Basics: Public Housing, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, https://
www.cbpp.org/research/policy-basics-public-housing [https://perma.cc/9R68-KGBX]
(last updated Nov. 15, 2017).
12. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWR\5-3\TWR307.txt unknown Seq: 4 15-APR-19 14:30
704 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 5
tance due to the higher price associated with staff and nursing care.13
In 2014, the United States paid approximately $152 billion for long-
term care through the Medicaid program.14
Most notably, public housing programs prevent homelessness. Al-
though the public often believes homelessness is rooted in mental ill-
ness, recent studies have shown that the root cause of homelessness is
most often a combination of “high demand for housing, increasing
prices, limited supply, and significantly high number of extremely low-
income residents.”15 Through providing housing units at an affordable
price, the federal government and local housing authorities are able to
reduce the frequency of panhandling, loitering, and camping in public
areas.16 Furthermore, public housing programs have a positive impact
on local communities. On a national scale, Public Housing Authorities
(“PHA”s)17 directly inject $8.1 billion into the economy by paying for
the cost of supplies and labor associated with capital improvements
and maintenance, while indirectly generating an additional $8.2 billion
annually.18
Public housing, like many social programs, has its origins in the
Great Depression.19 The federal government passed the Housing Act
of 1937 in response to numerous families in financial crisis.20 This ini-
tial act set public housing standards at the federal level to be imple-
mented locally21 by providing funding through Annual Contribution
Contracts (“ACC”s) for local PHAs.22 First, the PHAs would issue
municipal bonds to cover the cost of construction.23 Then, the ACCs
would authorize the federal government to reimburse the PHAs for
the principal and interest on the municipal bond.24 While federal
funding covered the cost of construction, PHAs were responsible for
the maintenance of the property.25 Each household was responsible
for paying 30% of its gross monthly income for rent.26 Initially, the
13. Id.
14. Deidre McPhillips, The Age-Old Dilemma, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Dec.
27, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2016-12-27/
funding-long-term-care-for-an-aging-global-population.
15. Letter from Flora Brewer to Vice President Assisted Hous., supra note 10.
16. Id.
17. PHAs are local, independent agencies that administer low-income housing
programs.
18. ECONSULT CORP., ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF PUBLIC HOUSING
FINAL REPORT 4 (Jan. 2007).
19. Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Does America Need Public Housing?, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 689, 734-35 (2012).
20. See id. at 691.
21. Lee, supra note 6.
22. Salsich, Jr., supra note 19, at 693.
23. Id. at 693-94.
24. Id at 694.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 698.
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rent collected from tenants was sufficient to cover the cost of
maintenance.27
During the Great Depression, public housing primarily provided af-
fordable homes to temporary low-income families.28 Following World
War II, the tenants in public housing transitioned to primarily veter-
ans returning from war.29 Subsequently, the public housing tenant
demographics changed from temporarily low-income tenants to indi-
viduals and families who were in chronic poverty.30 The transition
from temporarily low-income tenants to the chronically poor resulted
in a decrease in the number of households that were able to pay an
adequate monthly rent.31 With significantly less revenue raised from
rents, the PHAs had less funds to cover the cost of maintenance and
improvements.32 The majority of public housing properties in use to-
day were built in the years immediately following World War II in
order to provide housing to returning veterans.33 All 1.2 million units
available today are in excess of forty-five years old.34 The increasing
age of the properties, combined with the decrease in funds for mainte-
nance, has resulted in massive deterioration.35 Each year, 10,000 to
15,000 units are lost to deterioration,36 with only a small number of
units being replaced.37 Currently, there is a $26 billion back log of
repairs, not including ordinary maintenance costs, needed to make ex-
isting units “decent and economically sustainable.”38 Despite the high
need for repairs and improvements, the already insufficient federal
funding is decreasing further, causing public housing to suffer “a slow
death by financial starvation.”39
A. Rental Assistance Demonstration Program Overview
Congress initiated the RAD program through the Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 201240 with subsequent
modifications in the Continuing Appropriations Acts of 2014, 2016,
and 2017 and the Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropria-
27. Lee, supra note 6, at 764.
28. Salsich, Jr., supra note 19, at 694.
29. Lee, supra note 6.
30. Salsich, Jr., supra note 19, at 694.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See id. at 692; Lee, supra note 6, at 764.
34. Salsich, Jr., supra note 19, at 692.
35. Lee, supra note 6, at 766.
36. Id.
37. Policy Basics: Public Housing, supra note 11.
38. ABT ASSOCIATES, INC., CAPITAL NEEDS IN THE PUBLIC HOUSING PROGRAM,
at ii, vii (2010).
39. Lee, supra note 6, at 767.
40. ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 4, at xiv.
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tions Act of 2015.41 The program centralizes on four primary objec-
tives: “(1) preserving affordable housing . . . (2) [a]ttracting outside
sources of (private and public financing) . . . (3) [m]inimizing adverse
impacts on existing residents . . . [and] (4) [i]mproving housing quality
for residents.”42 The program is currently in a demonstration phase
and is set to terminate if not made permanent before September 30,
2020.43
Originally, Congress allotted for the conversion of only 60,000 units
to Section 8 housing under the RAD program.44 Following the pro-
gram’s enactment, the United States Department of Housing and Ur-
ban Development (“HUD”) received applications from PHAs
covering 184,000 units. In response, Congress raised the number of
allotted units in 2014 to 184,000 units to match the number of applica-
tions received in the previous year.45 In the subsequent year, Congress
raised the cap to 185,000 units46 and in 2017 to 225,000 units.47 In
2018, RAD experienced the largest cap increase in its history when
Congress raised the cap to 455,000 units.48
One attractive feature of the RAD program is its avoidance of any
increased need for federal funding. The funding PHAs receive from
HUD remains the same; however, public housing units converting
under RAD transfer their funds from the public housing or Mod
Rehab programs to housing vouchers.49
The RAD program is divided into two statutory components: (1)
transferring both public housing structures and tenants to long-term
voucher programs, and (2) converting Tenant Protection Vouchers is-
41. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5;
Consolidated & Further Continuing Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235,
128 Stat. 2130 (2014); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113,
129 Stat. 2242 (2015); Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31,
131 Stat. 135.
42. ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 4, at xiv.
43. Rental Assistance Demonstration: Notice of Increase in Cap and Rent Setting,
82 Fed. Reg. 40,013 (Aug. 23, 2017).
44. ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 4, at xiv.
45. Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriations Act, 2012,
Pub. L. No. 112-55, 125 Stat. 672 (2011).
46. Ed Gramlich, Nat’l Low Income Hous. Coal., Rental Assistance Demonstra-
tion, in 2015 ADVOCATES’ GUIDE 4-21 (2015).
47. HUD Releases Notice on RAD Cap Increase and Rent Setting, PAC. NW. RE-
GIONAL COUNCIL NAT’L ASS’N HOUSING & REDEVELOPMENT OFFICIALS, http://www
.pnrcnahro.org/hud-releases-notice-on-rad-cap-increase-and-rent-setting/? [https://per
ma.cc/AL6A-AK9R] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
48. Alison Bell & Douglas Rice, Congress Prioritizes Housing Programs in 2018
Funding Bill, Rejects Trump Administration Proposals, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (July 19, 2018), https://www.cbpp.org/research/housing/congress-prioriti
zes-housing-programs-in-2018-funding-bill-rejects-trump [https://perma.cc/2JT2-3T
89].
49. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION
(RAD): QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE TO MULTIFAMILY HOUSING REQUIREMENTS 3
(2015).
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sued under the Rent Supplement, Rent Assistance Payments, and
Mod Rehab programs to long-term voucher programs.50 This Com-
ment focuses on the first statutory component, which is best under-
stood through examining the component’s two significant processes:
(1) conversion of public housing unit ownership, and (2) relocation of
public housing tenants when necessary through the use of housing
vouchers.
1. Conversion of Public Housing Units
The first component of the RAD program addresses the current
need to renovate public housing units. RAD authorizes PHAs to sell
public housing complexes to private real estate developers and inves-
tors, with the PHA retaining a portion of the ownership.51 Under a
partial private ownership, the developers and investors are able to lev-
erage the property to receive private capital funding to rehabilitate
the property.52 Once the developer renovates the property, the owner
or developer of the housing complex can lease the property as mixed-
income, which means some tenants are traditional private market te-
nants paying the full rent directly to the landlord, while other house-
holds receive rental assistance through the long-term voucher
programs described in the following section.53
PHAs’ participation in the RAD program is strictly voluntarily.
However, the program limits PHA participation in two ways.54 First,
the congressionally imposed cap limits the number of units allowed to
convert to long-term voucher programs.55 This limitation creates a
competitive process for selection of units. Second, as enacted, only
Section 9 Public Housing or Section 8 Mod Rehab housing units are
eligible for conversion under the first component of RAD.56 Section 9
Public Housing includes dwellings owned by PHAs and rented to
qualified tenants for a rent that is usually equal to 30% of the house-
hold’s income.57 The Mod Rehab program is the predecessor of the
Project-Based Rental Assistance (“PBRA”) program. It allows pri-
vate-market landlords to devote units to tenants who receive rental
subsidies.58 The program was discontinued in 1991; however, some
units still exist under the PBRA through contract renewals between
50. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 1, at 1-2.
51. Id. at 30-31.
52. Id. at 22.
53. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMON-
STRATION (RAD): QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS CON-
VERTING TO PROJECT-BASED VOUCHER (PBV) ASSISTANCE 7 (2014).
54. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 1, at 1.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2.
57. Moderate Rehabilitation, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., https://
www.hud.gov/program_offices/public_indian_housing/programs/ph/modrehab [https:/
/perma.cc/E36H-UZQC] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
58. Id.
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the landlord and PHA.59 Although the RAD statute allows for Sec-
tion 8 Mod Rehab housing units to convert under the first component
of RAD, HUD does not approve applications for Mod Rehab projects
under the first component due to the highly competitive selection pro-
cess caused by the limited number of units allowed to convert under
the first component’s cap.60 Instead, RAD’s second component exclu-
sively approves Mod Rehab applications.61
Because RAD is currently in the demonstration phase, HUD re-
quires significant reporting and publishing of the program’s results.
HUD released the first Interim Report on RAD in September of
2016.62 Within the limited time that HUD studied the conversion of
former public housing and Mod Rehab units for its first publication of
the program’s results —185 public housing complexes already com-
pleted the rehabilitation process under RAD.63 As of the time of the
first Interim Report, the PHAs raised $2.25 billion from private
sources to invest in rehabilitating public housing units.64
2. Relocation of Tenants
The second process PHAs face when converting public housing
under RAD’s first component is the relocation of tenants residing in
the public housing complexes.65 Although some projects use a “con-
version in place model” that allows ownership to be transferred and
renovations to be made while tenants continue to reside at the com-
plex, some projects require public housing tenants to relocate to a
Project Based Voucher (“PBV”) or  PBRA property.66 These vouch-
ers allow tenants to relocate to reserved units in mixed-income
properties owned primarily by for-profit landlords. Landlords partici-
pating in either the PBV and PBRA programs enter into a contract
with HUD known as the Housing Assistance Payments (“HAP”) con-
tract, which outlines the landlord’s obligations in order to receive te-
nants through the program.67
59. Id.
60. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 1, at 2.
61. Id.
62. ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 4.
63. Id. at iii.
64. Id.
65. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 1, at 1-2.
66. See id. at 27.
67. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRA-
TION: GUIDE TO CHOOSING BETWEEN PROJECT-BASED VOUCHERS (PBVS) AND PRO-
JECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE (PBRA) FOR PUBLIC HOUSING CONVERSIONS
(2015). See also U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD 52618, PART II PBRA
HOUSING ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS CONTRACT RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION
(RAD) FOR THE CONVERSION OF PUBLIC HOUSING TO PROJECT-BASED SECTION 8
(COMPONENT 1) (2017), https://www.radresource.net/output.cfm?id=pbrahapp2new
[https://perma.cc/U5MA-4VDF]; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD 52515,
RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION (RAD) FOR THE CONVERSION OF PUBLIC
HOUSING TO THE SECTION 8 PROJECT-BASED VOUCHER (PBV) PROGRAM (2017),
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The HAP contract describes the manner in which rent is paid to the
landlord. The contract requires the PHA to determine the total
amount of rent owed to the landlord for each unit.68 The rent is then
paid through a combination of the tenant’s contribution and funds
from the PHA.69 The PHA is not given any additional funds when
converting tenants from public housing. Instead, the PHA’s contribu-
tion to the rent paid under the HAP contracts are transferred from
the funds previously provided to the PHA for its public housing
programs.70
The amount of rent due is generally calculated as the lowest of
“110[%] of the applicable fair market rent for the unit bedroom size
minus any utility allowance” with some limited exceptions, or the
“reasonable rent as determined in accordance with 24 CFR
983.303.”71 The reasonableness standard requires the PHA to com-
pare the proposed rent for the PBV or PBRA units to at least three
other similar units in the area not receiving rental assistance.72 The
PHA must consider factors, such as “the location, quality, size, unit
type, and age of the contract unit; and [a]menities, housing services,
maintenance, and utilities to be provided by the owner.”73 The rent
determined by the initial HAP contract may be adjusted on each anni-
versary of the contract in order to continue to provide the landlord
with the property’s fair market value.74 However, the updated con-
tract may not reduce the amount of rent due to the landlord below the
amount determined in the initial HAP contract.75
Tenants participating in the PBV or PBRA programs pay rent di-
rectly to the landlord in the amount of “the highest of [30%] of [the
tenant’s] adjusted income, [10%] of gross income, or the portion of
welfare assistance.”76 The PHA pays the landlord the difference be-
tween the amount of rent established in the HAP contract and the
amount paid by the tenant.77
https://www.radresource.net/output.cfm?id=newradpbvp1 [https://perma.cc/6P59-
MKNV](part 1), https://www.radresource.net/output.cfm?id=pbvhapnewp2 [https://
perma.cc/Z9C2-5Y5A] (part 2).
68. See PART II PBRA HOUSING ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS CONTRACT RENTAL AS-
SISTANCE DEMONSTRATION (RAD) FOR THE CONVERSION OF PUBLIC HOUSING TO
PROJECT-BASED SECTION 8 (COMPONENT 1), supra note 67, at 7.
69. Id. at 2.
70. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., ANNUAL CONTRIBUTIONS CONTRACT:
PROJECT-BASED SECTION 8 CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION 10 (2000).
71. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 53, at 8.
72. 24 C.F.R. § 983.303(d)(1) (2017).
73. § 983.303(c)(2).
74. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 1, at 186.
75. § 983.303(a).
76. Renewal of Section 8 Project-Based Rental Assistance, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING
& URBAN DEV., https://www.hud.gov/hudprograms/rs8pbra [https://perma.cc/G55Z-
R7JD] (last visited Feb. 8, 2019).
77. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 1, at 11-12.
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a. Project-Based Vouchers
The first relocation option is to offer tenants a unit under the PBV
program. PBVs allow private landlords to contract with the local
housing authorities to allot a specific number of units within a building
or complex. Housing complexes accepting PBVs are limited to devot-
ing 50% of its units to PBVs.78 The initial contract has a term of fif-
teen years.79 One year after receiving a PBV, a tenant may convert to
a Housing Choice Voucher (“HCV”), which binds the voucher to the
tenant, allowing the tenant to choose any rental unit in the private
market.80
b. Project-Based Rental Assistance
The second option for tenant relocation is to offer tenants a unit
under the PBRA program.81 The PBRA program is the most common
rental assistance program administered by HUD with 1.2 million
households currently housed through the program.82 HUD’s Office of
Multifamily Housing administers the PBRA program, unlike the PBV
program.83 Additionally, landlords are not restricted by a limit on the
number of units they may devote to PBRAs.84 PBRAs also allow pri-
vate landlords to contract with the local housing authority to devote
specific units to tenants receiving rental assistance through the PBRA
program rather than an allotted number of floating units like the PBV
program.85 The initial contract has a term of twenty years.86 In con-
trast to the PBV program, tenants receiving PBRAs may not request
an HCV until they have lived at the PBRA property for two years.87
B. Advantages and Disadvantages of the RAD Program
The transition from public housing to mixed-income and privately
managed communities presents many benefits to tenants and the af-
fordable housing system overall. First, this program resolves the pri-
mary issues of the deterioration of public housing units and the lack of
78. RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION: GUIDE TO CHOOSING BETWEEN PRO-
JECT-BASED VOUCHERS (PBVS) AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE (PBRA)
FOR PUBLIC HOUSING CONVERSIONS, supra note 67, at 4.
79. Gramlich, supra note 46, at 4-22.
80. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., FACT SHEET #10: THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN PROJECT-BASED VOUCHERS AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE 2.
81. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 1, at 1.
82. RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION: GUIDE TO CHOOSING BETWEEN PRO-
JECT-BASED VOUCHERS (PBVS) AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE (PBRA)
FOR PUBLIC HOUSING CONVERSIONS, supra note 67, at 2.
83. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 80, at 1.
84. RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION: GUIDE TO CHOOSING BETWEEN PRO-
JECT-BASED VOUCHERS (PBVS) AND PROJECT-BASED RENTAL ASSISTANCE (PBRA)
FOR PUBLIC HOUSING CONVERSIONS, supra note 67, at 4.
85. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 80, at 1.
86. Gramlich, supra note 46, at 4-22.
87. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 80.
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funding for rehabilitation. Second, these programs also offer a benefit
to the local economies in which the properties are located.88 In RAD’s
first year, local PHAs were able to leverage property valued at $250
million to raise $2.5 billion in capital, a 9:1 ratio.89 Additionally, land-
lords are able to acquire loans and investments to purchase and reno-
vate new properties by using the HAP contract as proof of the
landlord’s expected profits and the ability to repay loans.90 This gener-
ates profit to the landlords, developers, investors, and banking institu-
tions. The rehabilitation process also injects income into the local
economy through hiring labor from the community and purchasing
supplies to complete construction.91
The PBV and PBRA programs also provide lasting benefits to te-
nants receiving assistance by providing tenants with the opportunity to
move into communities that would otherwise be inaccessible due to
the high cost of living.92 These communities often have the best
schools and greater opportunity for financial growth. Children under
the age of thirteen who move into wealthier communities through the
use of housing vouchers are 32% more likely to attend college and
will earn 31% more income per year as young adults in comparison to
those who remain in low-income communities.93 Furthermore, adults
who move to areas of higher opportunity greatly reduced their risk of
extreme obesity and diabetes and experienced 33% less instances of
depression.94 Despite these benefits, the program is not without its
critics.
Many of the RAD program’s opponents, such as House Represen-
tative Maxine Waters, critique the program for transitioning public as-
sets to the private industry.95 Rather than see public housing programs
switch to private management, these opponents prefer to fully fund
the public housing program and needed capital improvements.96 How-
ever, the nation’s increasing debt has prevented this from being feasi-
ble. Another criticism of the program centers on the developer’s
ability to utilize these programs to gain access to development subsi-
88. Letter from Flora Brewer to Vice President Assisted Hous., supra note 10.
89. ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 4, at xviii.
90. See id.
91. Letter from Flora Brewer to Vice President Assisted Hous., supra note 10.
92. Barbara Sard & Douglas Rice, Realizing the Housing Voucher Program’s Po-
tential to Enable Families to Move to Better Neighborhoods,Policy Futures, CTR. ON





95. Press Release, U.S. House Comm. on Fin. Servs., Waters Calls on Obama to
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dies, such as tax credits, while only being temporarily required to pro-
vide affordable housing.97 Once the restrictions end, the developer
can increase rents to market value.98 These high profits generated
through subsidies may result in a “massive windfall to private
owners.”99
Furthermore, the RAD program is merely a temporary solution to
affordable housing needs. As the cost of housing increases, the num-
ber of households needing subsidies will increase. Public housing is
already not available for all those that qualify due to a lack of funding.
For example, the city of Fort Worth, Texas, has capped its waiting list
at its current amount of 5,000 households.100 Nationwide, only one in
four households eligible for housing assistance will receive assistance
due to insufficient funding.101 Thus, RAD may assist in addressing the
needs for capital improvement, but it is not a comprehensive and final
solution to affordable housing.
The combination of public housing deterioration with the lack of
funds to renovate and repair these units make the cost-neutral solu-
tion presented in RAD appealing as a short-term solution. However,
the success of the program relies on the ability to relocate current
public housing tenants to private market housing under the PBV and
PBRA programs. Therefore, the participation of the landlords in the
private industry is vital to the success of housing assistance in the
United States.
III. LEGAL EXPOSURE OF PRIVATE LANDLORDS PARTICIPATING
IN PBV AND PBRA PROGRAMS
While the RAD program appears to be a much-needed glimmer of
hope for public housing, many areas have yet to participate.102 Partici-
pation in the PBV and PBRA programs presents unique legal chal-
lenges by imposing additional contractual, statutory, and regulatory
obligations on landlords in addition to the legal exposure created by
the insolvency of the tenants housed through these programs. In-
creased legal risks often result in an increase in cost. These challenges
have a greater impact in rural communities and areas with higher costs
of development where it is more difficult to attract investors.103
97. Brandon M. Weiss, Residual Value Capture in Subsidized Housing, 10 HARV.
L. & POL’Y REV. 521, 525 (2016).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. How to Apply – Housing Choice Vouchers, FORT WORTH HOUSING SOLU-
TIONS, https://www.fwhs.org/how-to-apply-housing-choice-vouchers/ [https://perma.cc/
27KL-FBVC] (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
101. Weiss, supra note 97, at 522-23.
102. ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 4, at 175.
103. Id.
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A. Statutory and Regulatory Created Risks
Several laws regulate the distribution of public funds and impose
penalties and fees for failing to comply with them. By accepting PBV
and PBRA tenants, landlords voluntarily subject themselves to these
additional statutes and regulations. These include the requirement to
(1) affirmatively further fair housing,104 (2) renew leases to tenants
unless a “good cause” exists to deny the renewal,105 (3) implement a
grievance process,106 (4) adhere to the Housing Quality Standards and
participate in inspections,107 and (5) provide information to HUD as
requested for purposes of monitoring and evaluating the RAD
program.108
1. Affirmative Duty to Further Fair Housing
The federal government prohibits discrimination against specifically
protected classes of individuals in housing transactions.109 The Fair
Housing Act specifically protects individuals from discrimination
based on race, color, national original, religion, sex, disability, and the
presence of children.110 Additionally, the Act imposes on federal de-
partments and agencies an affirmative duty to further fair housing.111
Thus, the RAD program must show that procedures in selecting, con-
structing, and transferring households do not discriminate against
these protected classes.112 This higher standard of affirmatively fur-
thering fair housing must be a consideration in the selection of com-
plexes entering into a HAP contract to receive PBVs and PBRAs.113
HUD uses two methods to ensure it meets this standard. First,
HUD prohibits PHAs from entering into a HAP contract with land-
lords who have (1) “a charge, cause determination, lawsuit, or letter of
findings” relating to the “systemic violation of Fair Housing Act;” (2)
a “lawsuit filed by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) alleging a pat-
tern or practice of discrimination or denial of rights to a group of per-
sons;” or (3) a cause determination “concerning a systemic violation
of provision of a state or local law proscribing discrimination in hous-
104. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 1, at 68.
105. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD 52530.C, TENANCY ADDENDUM
SECTION 8 PROJECT-BASED VOUCHER PROGRAM (2015).
106. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 49, at 29.
107. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD 52530B, SECTION 8 PROJECT-
BASED VOUCHER PROGRAM PBV HOUSING ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS CONTRACT EX-
ISTING HOUSING PART 1 OF HAP CONTRACT (2015).
108. Lee, supra note 6, at 785.
109. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 1, at 18.
110. File a Complaint, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING & URBAN DEV., https://www.hud
.gov/program_offices/ fair_housing_equal_opp/online-complaint [https://perma.cc/DN
3N-EPJ5] (last visited Jan. 31, 2019).
111. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 1, at 18.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 140.
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ing based on sexual orientation or gender identity.”114 Once a HAP
agreement is signed, the contract may be revoked if the landlord fails
to comply with fair housing standards.115 Additionally, each landlord
participating in the RAD conversion process is required to develop
and submit an Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Plan
(“AFHMP”).116 The AFHMP requires the landlord to describe its
planned advertising and marketing activities to solicit tenants and to
show how its plan will successfully attract specified categories of indi-
viduals determined to be least likely to apply.117
Participation in the PBV and PBRA programs also exposes land-
lords to additional causes of action in comparison to strictly private
market landlords. In a traditional, private market lease, a tenant or
prospective tenant may have a cause of action against a landlord
under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act, commonly known as the Fair
Housing Act, for acts of discrimination in the sale or lease of hous-
ing.118 In addition to this cause of action, a landlord receiving federal
funds, such as those received through the PBV and PBRA programs,
could be liable not only under Title VIII, but also Title VI of the act,
which prohibits discrimination in programs receiving federal financial
assistance.119
2. Required Lease Renewals
In traditional housing, a landlord may freely choose not to renew a
lease, with few limitations restricting the landlord’s right to deny a
renewal, such as reasons based on discrimination. In contrast, a land-
lord renting to tenants through the PBV or PBRA programs may not
deny the renewal of a lease unless the landlord can show “good
cause.”120 Good cause includes: “(a) disturbance of neighbors, (b) de-
struction of property, or (c) living or housekeeping habits that cause
damage to the unit or premises.”121 Although a landlord who does not
desire to renew a lease generally has reasons covered under the pre-
scribed “good cause” exceptions, the participation in these programs
imposes a burden on the landlord to prove its cause to HUD.122
114. Id.
115. Id. at 141.
116. Id. at 112; U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., HUD 92243-PRA, AFFIRMA-
TIVE FAIR HOUSING MARKETING PLAN (AFHMP) – MULTIFAMILY HOUSING (2014).
117. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 1, at 113; U.S. DEP’T OF
HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 116.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012).
119. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012).
120. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 105.
121. Id.
122. See id.
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3. Grievance Process
Tenants receiving housing assistance through RAD receive special
safeguards to ensure the protection of their rights in the transition
from government-managed properties to privately- managed proper-
ties. One of these statutory protections is the implementation of a
grievance process for tenants.123 If a landlord seeks to take any action
that may be adverse to a tenant, such as reducing the tenant’s paid
utility allowance, the landlord must give the tenant notice in writing
explaining the landlord’s grounds to take the action.124 The tenants
have a right to an informal hearing with the property owner and an
impartial member of the staff.125 Such hearings must be held within a
reasonable time frame.126 Each tenant has the right to bring a person
to represent him or her in the hearing.127 Additionally, the tenant may
make statements, question witnesses, and examine evidence.128 Fol-
lowing the hearing, the property owner must provide a written deci-
sion that explains the grounds for the action and the basis of the
decision within a reasonable time frame.129
4. Housing Quality Standards
Housing Quality Standards (“HQS”) are established by RAD no-
tices and regulations and further imposed on landlords through the
incorporation of these standards in the HAP contract.130 The HAP
contract subjects landlords to a higher premise quality standard than
traditional landlords.131 The landlord must maintain the property in a
manner that provides “decent, safe, and sanitary housing in accor-
dance with the HQS.”132 These standards require the site, building
exteriors, dwelling units, and building systems —such as HVAC and
electrical systems—to be in good repair and free of health and safety
hazards.133
Furthermore, landlords are subject to numerous inspections to en-
sure they meet the standard of quality required by the HAP contract.
Prior to entering into a HAP contract, the PHA must inspect each






129. Id. at 30.
130. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., RENTAL ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION
(RAD): QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE FOR PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECTS CONVERTING TO
PROJECT-BASED VOUCHER (PBV) ASSISTANCE 9–10 (2014).
131. See HUD Physical Condition Standards and Inspection Requirements, 24
C.F.R. § 5.703(g) (1999) (requiring landlords to adhere to all State and local codes in
addition to HUD’s physical condition standards).
132. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., supra note 123, at 6.
133. 24 C.F.R. §§ 5.703(b)–(c) (2018).
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unit that is subject to the contractual agreement.134 The unit is subject
to another PHA inspection prior to any new household moving into
the unit.135 Further, the PHA conducts annual inspections of at least
20% of the contracted units that are randomly selected by the
PHA.136 If 20% of the units selected for random inspection fail to
meet the quality standards, the PHA must inspect all of the contracted
units.137 The PHA also may inspect contracted units if it receives com-
plaints regarding maintenance or other inspection related issues.138
5. Reporting Requirements
The RAD program is in a demonstration phase that requires HUD
to publish reports, findings, and statistics on the program’s progress to
evaluate the success of the program and determine whether RAD
should be made permanent.139 HUD’s requirement to report is im-
puted on the landlords, PHAs, and developers participating in the
program.140 Each must provide HUD with periodic reports, audits,
and access to the properties for on-site reviews.141 While the exact
data HUD requests from landlords may vary, the HAP contract re-
quires that landlords make all records and documentation available to
HUD and the local PHA.142 These extensive reporting requirements
can be burdensome on for-profit landlords who rely on staff efficiency
to ensure a profit or, in some instances, may not have sufficient staff
to complete the requirements.
B. Contractual Risks
In addition to those created by statutes and regulations, the HAP
contract with the local housing authority creates further legal risks
and costs. These risks and costs include limits on the eviction process,
restrictions placed on the contents of the landlords’ leases, and limits
placed on the sale or transfer of the property. If a party breaches or
defaults, the PHA or HUD may exercise numerous remedies includ-
ing denying, suspending, or reducing rental payments or terminating
the HAP contract.143
134. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 107, at 2.
135. HUD Dwelling Units Rule, 24 C.F.R. § 983.103(c) (2005).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 24 C.F.R. § 5.705.
139. Lee, supra note 6, at 768–69.
140. See id. at 789.
141. See id. at 790.
142. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., SECTION 8 PROJECT-BASED
VOUCHER PROGRAM PBV HOUSING ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS CONTRACT EXISTING
HOUSING PART 2 OF HAP CONTRACT 15 (2015).
143. Id. at 13.
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1. Eviction Process: Termination of the Lease During Lease Term
While traditional landlords are also limited in their ability to termi-
nate a lease, landlords participating in the PBV or PBRA programs
are strictly limited to five general causes for evicting a tenant receiving
assistance.144 A landlord may only terminate a PBV- or PBRA-
funded lease due to:
(1) serious or repeated violation of the lease;
(2) violation of federal, state, or local law that imposes obligations
on the tenant in connection with the occupancy or use of the unit
and the premises;
(3) criminal activity or alcohol abuse;
(4) failure of a family in a supportive service excepted unit to com-
plete its Family Self Sufficiency (“FSS”) Contract of Participation145
or other supportive services requirement without good cause; or
(5) other good cause.146
HUD further limits the causes provided by limiting the definition of
criminal activity to those activities that threaten the “health or safety
of, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by, other residents”
or those in the immediate vicinity; violent crimes committed on or
near the property; or drug-related crimes on or near the property.147
Further, “good cause” is limited to “something the family did or failed
to do” including damaging the property or causing disturbances.148
Landlords of non-assisted units are also strictly limited in the basis for
evicting tenants; however, PBV and PBRA landlords have an obliga-
tion to prove their basis of eviction to HUD in addition to the general
eviction proceedings. Further, a RAD landlord who terminates a lease
without sufficient cause is subject to remedies created under the HAP
contract in addition to any tenant remedies created by the lease or
state law.
2. Limitations on the Sale or Transfer of Property
The HAP contract specifically prohibits the assignment of the con-
tract unless assigned after receiving federal approval from HUD.149
Because the sale of the property would require the assignment or
breach of the HAP contract, this provision effectively limits the sale
144. See Id.
145. PHAs select families to participate in the FSS program. Participating families
are required to meet specified goals targeted at increasing the family’s income and
reducing the dependency on government assistance. Services, such as employment
counseling and child care, are provided to assist families in reaching these goals.
These goals and services are captured in the FSS Contract of Participation. OFFICE OF
PUB. HOUS. & VOUCHER PROGRAMS & OFFICE OF PUBLIC HOUS. INVS., FACT SHEET
FAMILY SELF-SUFFICIENCY (FSS) PROGRAM (2016).
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or transfer of the contracted property. Any subsequent owner to the
property must be independently eligible to enter the contract.150 Sub-
sequent owners are ineligible if they have previously violated the Fair
Housing Act, are a relative of one of the tenants, have committed
specified crimes, or have violated HQS or state or local housing
codes.151 If an owner must sell his or her property, the owner has the
additional obstacle of securing a sale with an eligible owner that is
also willing to be subjected to the additional requirements and penal-
ties discussed in this Comment.
Furthermore, if a HAP-contracted property enters foreclosure, the
immediate successor takes the property subject to the HAP contract
as well as the leases between the original owner and tenants receiving
housing assistance.152 This could potentially limit the number of po-
tential purchasers and decrease the amount that a purchaser would be
willing to pay for the property. A reduced foreclosure purchase price
could subject the original owner to a higher deficiency judgment to
cover the remaining debt owed after the deduction of the foreclosure
price.
3. Restrictions on Lease Agreements
While leasing requirements vary across states, in some states, like
Texas, landlords and tenants are not bound to strict requirements re-
garding the contents of the lease.153 Provided that the provisions are
not illegal or unconscionable and that certain required statutory provi-
sions are included, the parties are free to draft and agree to provisions
as they choose.154 This policy allows parties to tailor their lease to
unique circumstances or to provide better liability protection to one
or both of the parties of the lease. For example, a landlord may au-
thorize the assignment or sublease of the unit upon the landlord’s ap-
proval. This provision would protect the tenant from the financial
liability resulting from breaching the lease, while also protecting the
landlord against the loss of rent.
The HAP contract restricts the contents of the lease.155 First, HUD
provides a model standardized lease form.156 Further, the HAP con-
tract requires that the landlord and tenant sign a Tenancy Addendum
written by HUD.157 The landlord is prohibited from making any
150. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 142.
151. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., SECTION 8 PROJECT-BASED
VOUCHER PROGRAM PBV HOUSING ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS CONTRACT EXISTING
HOUSING PART 2 OF HAP CONTRACT (2015).
152. Id.
153. See Landlord and Tenant 49 TEX. JUR. 3D § 19 (2016).
154. Id.
155. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 151, at 9.
156. See U.S DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., MODEL LEASE FOR SUBSIDIZED
PROGRAMS (2014).
157. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 151, at 9.
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changes to the addendum.158 Additionally, the HAP contract provides
that when a conflict exists between the addendum and the lease, the
addendum controls.159 Contained within the addendum and the HAP
contract is a prohibition against the assignment or sublease of the
unit.160 The addendum further requires the approval for any changes
in the composition of the household.161 This may result in unexpected
turnover in the unit if the tenant must move and is unable to assign
the unit to another individual.
4. Remedies under the Housing Assistance Payments Contracts
In addition to the statutory penalties, PBV and PBRA landlords
under RAD are subject to the standard contractual remedies granted
by law as well as remedies specifically agreed to within the HAP con-
tract. Beyond the standard actions constituting a breach of contract,
the agreement also provides that certain crimes, such as drug-related
crimes, constitute a breach of the contract.162 If the owner is in breach
of the contract, the PHA and HUD have the ability to reduce, abate,
or terminate the housing assistance payments to the owner; seek an
injunction, sanctions, or specific performance; or terminate the HAP
contract.163
C. Tenant Insolvency Related Risks
Finally, legal risks arise or are feared to arise from the insolvency of
tenants receiving housing subsidies. Additionally, the public often
holds false beliefs in certain stereotypes and prejudices regarding
those living in public housing, including the belief there is an in-
creased risk of damage to units, breaches to the lease, and security
concerns.
1. Property Damage
At the end of the lease, or upon the tenant moving out of the unit, a
tenant generally has the obligation to return the property to the land-
lord in good condition.164 The landlord has two remedies to cover the
cost of repairing damage. First, landlords traditionally require a tenant
to provide a security deposit prior to moving into the unit. A security
deposit is defined as an “advance of money . . . that is intended prima-
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., SECTION 8 TENANT-BASED ASSIS-
TANCE HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHER PROGRAM (2014)
161. Id.
162. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 151, at 13–14.
163. Id.; Lee, supra note 6, at 792.
164. Improvements or Alterations of Property by Tenant 3 TEX. PRAC. GUIDE REAL
ESTATE LITIG. § 11:67, (citing Dunlap v. Mars Plumbing Supply Co., 504 S.W.2d 917
(Tex. App.–San Antonio, 1973)).
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rily to secure performance under a lease or a dwelling that has been
entered into by a landlord and a tenant.”165 The landlord may deduct
the cost of repairing damage that exceeds normal wear and tear from
the security deposit.166 When the cost of damage is at or below the
security deposit amount, the landlord is financially protected from
damage caused by the tenant as well as any resulting litigation costs
and the costs associated with collecting a judgment. If the damage ex-
ceeds the amount of the security deposit, the landlord may seek reme-
dies through a civil claim to recover the amount of the damages that
exceed the security deposit.167
The tenants that qualify for housing assistance are generally insol-
vent due to the income requirements for eligibility. If a tenant dam-
ages the property unit to the extent that the repairs exceed the
amount of the security deposit, the landlord may be unable to collect
on a judgment against the tenant for the amounts owed beyond those
covered by the deposit. The HAP contract specifically protects the
PHA and HUD from liability to the landlord for any damage to the
property unit created by the tenant.168 The HAP contract simultane-
ously requires the unit be maintained in accordance with the HQS.169
Thus, if the tenant is insolvent, the landlord is liable for repairing the
damage to the unit to ensure it meets HQS requirements. Further, the
HAP contract prohibits the landlord from requiring the tenant to pay
a higher security deposit amount than customary in the locality or
than required from tenants in un-assisted units.170 This leaves the
landlord with few options to protect against bearing the cost of repairs
to the unit resulting from a tenant’s actions or negligence.
2. Security Concerns
Generally, a landlord does not owe a duty to a tenant to protect the
tenant against physical harm.171 However, a landlord does have the
duty to use ordinary care in providing protection against foreseeable
dangers.172 The foreseeability of dangers that trigger the responsibility
to provide additional security measures is based on the frequency and
types of crimes in the immediate area.173 Often the public assumes the
presence of public housing and assisted units causes a higher rate of
crime. If true, this could result in the landlord having the financial
burden of providing additional security measures and could result in a
165. Id. § 11:71 (citing TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.102 (West 2018)).
166. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.104 (a)–(b) (West 2018).
167. 3 TEX. PRAC. GUIDE REAL ESTATE LITIG. § 11:67.
168. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 107.
169. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 151, at 7.
170. Id. at 11.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
172. Id.
173. Id.
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negligence claim against the landlord if the landlord fails to provide
sufficient protections.
Further, many units participating in RAD are mixed-income com-
munities, meaning the landlord rents some of the units to market-rent
tenants. The safety of the tenants may impact the marketability of
other units, which can cause the rents to decline or vacancies to in-
crease. The fears of increased crime and decreased property values
often serve as motivators for the public to resist the introduction of
public housing or housing vouchers to new communities and may
discourage landlords from participating in the PBV or PBRA
programs.174
Numerous studies have examined the impact of traditional public
housing and housing vouchers on crime and property values in the
community. Some studies found that traditional public housing often
correlated with an increase in crime in the community but found that
the relationship was not causational.175 Instead, the increase in crime
resulted from the already declining conditions in the community
where the public housing was placed.176 Thus, public housing was
often seen as being related to crime based on the historical choice of
location of public housing complexes.
As housing voucher programs are largely replacing traditional pub-
lic housing, studies have begun to evaluate the effect of housing
vouchers on crime and property values in their local communities.
These studies have found that vouchers have no impact on crime, with
some finding that crime may be reduced by the introduction of hous-
ing vouchers into a community. There is a theory that this reduction is
a result of crime being less necessary because housing assistance pro-
grams allow households to have more money to cover expenses177 or
because the tenants have more pride in their community.178 The posi-
tive effect of housing assistance on communities led the National
Crime Prevention Council to call for the construction of public hous-
ing in an effort to stabilize communities and reduce crime.179
Additionally, HUD and PHAs have implemented measures to pre-
vent crime in assisted housing units.180 The HAP contract requires
landlords and tenants to sign the Tenancy Addendum, which specifi-
174. Michael C. Lens, The Impact of Housing Vouchers on Crime in US Cities and
Suburbs, URB. STUD. 51(6) 1274 (May 2014).
175. Id. at 1277–78.
176. See id. at 1276.
177. Id. at 1276.
178. Nat’l Crime Prevention Council, Strategy: Ensure Supply of Affordable Hous-
ing, https://web.archive.org/web/20040331003425/http://www.ncpc.org/ncpc/ncpc/
?pg=2088-9318 [https://perma.cc/24NL-566N] (last visited Feb. 5, 2019).
179. BUS. AND PROF’L PEOPLE FOR THE PUB. INTEREST, Myths and Stereotypes
about Affordable Housing (June 2004).
180. See generally HUD Lease and Tenancy Rule, 24 C.F.R. § 982.308(f) (1999)
(requiring that a Tenancy Agreement is included in every HAP contract); U.S. DEP’T
OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., TENANCY ADDENDUM SECTION 8 PROJECT-BASED
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cally allows the landlord to evict tenants based on the tenant’s partici-
pation in criminal activities.181 Further, HUD and PHA may prohibit
the tenant from receiving any further housing assistance based on the
tenant’s criminal activities. The threat of losing shelter is often a suffi-
cient deterrent to crime. For these reasons, the fear of increased crime
and the resulting increased exposure to liability is unfounded and
based on misinformation.
IV. POLICIES AND PROGRAM SUGGESTIONS TO
MITIGATE LEGAL EXPOSURE
The implementation of certain policies or programs can mitigate the
legal risks to landlords and encourage more private-industry participa-
tion in the RAD program. These programs may include the creation
of risk pools to reimburse landlords for property damage; facilitating
partnerships between PBV and PBRA tenants and local non-profit
organizations; increasing the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit cap;
and adopting inclusionary and incentivized zoning ordinances to in-
centivize affordable housing development.
A. Mitigating Financial Risks Associated with Tenant Insolvency
1. Landlord Mitigation Fund
Many regions and organizations are addressing the perceived risk of
renting to insolvent tenants through the creation of landlord mitiga-
tion funds or risk pools that are designed to reimburse landlords for
expenses arising from property damage, unpaid rent, or other ex-
penses related to renting to insolvent tenants.182 Several states includ-
ing Minnesota, Florida, Oregon, and California have established
landlord mitigation funds.183 While the specifics vary across each pro-
gram, the landlord mitigation funds are often established by a dona-
tion of funds from participating cities, counties, state, or local non-
profit organizations.184 The mitigation fund defines the eligibility of
tenants and, therefore, landlords.185 Additionally, the mitigation fund
establishes the requirements for claims, including what type of dam-
ages are covered, the minimum or maximum values of the claim, and
VOUCHER PROGRAM (2015) (stating that owners may terminate tenancy for certain
criminal activities).
181. See generally § 982.308(f) (requiring that a Tenancy Agreement is included in
every HAP contract); U.S. DEPT. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., supra note 180 (stat-
ing that owners may terminate tenancy for certain criminal activities)
182. Hattie Hiler, Landlord Risk Mitigation Funds: A Literature and Design Re-
view, MINN. HOUSING FIN. AGENCY 4, 6 (Aug. 2016), www.mnhousing.gov/get/
MHFA_1040835 [https://perma.cc/995G-TLBC]; See, e.g., U.S. INTERAGENCY COUN-
CIL ON HOMELESSNESS, ENGAGING & SUPPORTING LANDLORDS THROUGH RISK MITI-
GATION FUNDS (2016).
183. See, e.g., U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 182.
184. See, e.g., id.
185. See, e.g., id.
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any required documentation or preconditions to receiving the reim-
bursement.186 To date, these funds have largely targeted veterans, in-
dividuals in rehabilitation centers, the chronically homeless, or
individuals holding Housing Choice Vouchers.187 The majority of
funds impose caps on claims, often between $1,000–$3,000.188 In some
cases, programs are designed as a shared risk policy, which requires
the landlord to pay a portion of the claim, with the remaining percent-
age reimbursed by the fund.189
Oregon was the first state to establish a state-wide landlord mitiga-
tion fund. In 2014, the Oregon legislature enacted the Housing Choice
Landlord Guarantee program in response to a tight rental market that
discouraged landlords from accepting tenants with housing vouch-
ers.190 Initially, the legislature allocated $475,000 to the fund, but later
increased the fund by an additional $300,000.191 All households hold-
ing a Housing Choice Voucher or Veterans Affairs Supportive Hous-
ing (“VASH”) voucher are automatically eligible.192 Thus, landlords
leasing a unit to a tenant holding an HCV or VASH may access the
fund if that tenant causes specified damages to the landlord. This fund
allows reimbursement for “property damage, unpaid rent, or other
damages: [1]caused as a result of the tenant’s occupancy under the
Housing Choice Voucher Program [2]that exceed normal wear and
tear; and [3]that are in excess of $500 but not more than $5,000 per
tenancy.”193 As a precautionary act to prevent abuse, the legislature
amended the statute to require landlords to obtain a judgment against
the tenant, thereby requiring the landlord to prove damages to a le-
gally sufficient degree.194 In 2016, there were 34,726 households eligi-
ble for coverage under the Housing Choice Landlord Guarantee;
however, the claims made to the fund represented less than 0.003% of
eligible households.195
Similar programs exist throughout the United States. The Minne-
sota legislature initiated a landlord mitigation fund in May 2016, allo-
cating $250,000 in funds.196 The City of Orlando created a mitigation
fund in 2014.197 The fund initially limited claims solely to property
186. See, e.g., id.
187. Hiler, supra note 182, at 9–10; see, e.g., U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON
HOMELESSNESS, supra note 182.
188. Hiler, supra note 182, at 9–10.
189. Hiler, supra note 182, at 22–23; See, e.g., U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON
HOMELESSNESS, supra note 182.
190. OR. REV. STAT. § 456.378 (2015).
191. Hiler, supra note 182, at 16.
192. Id.
193. OR. REV. STAT. § 456.378.
194. Id.
195. Hiler, supra note 182, at 16–17.
196. Id.; U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 182.
197. Hiler, supra note 182, at 17; U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS,
supra note 182.
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damage, but the city expanded the fund to offer coverage for short-
term vacancies.198 Between its enactment and 2016, no landlords had
filed a claim to receive reimbursement from the mitigation fund, “sup-
porting the idea that such a fund provides peace of mind rather than
address[es] a significant existing financial need for landlords.”199 Nu-
merous other cities and counties including Seattle, Washington; Nor-
folk, Virginia; Fargo-Moorhead, North Dakota; Dakota County,
Minnesota; and Denver, Colorado have implemented landlord mitiga-
tion funds.200
Studies on the successes of these programs have concluded that
landlord mitigation funds are most successful when the programs
“outline[ ] claim guidelines, household participation, landlord engage-
ment, and program evaluation.”201 Additionally, publicity is important
to effectively notify potential landlords of the availability of funds.202
To date, landlord mitigation funds have primarily focused on HCVs,
VASH, or tenants leaving rehabilitation centers.203 States and locali-
ties seeking to encourage landlords to participate in the RAD pro-
gram through contracting to receive PBV or PBRA vouchers should
consider developing landlord mitigation funds that offer coverage for
these specific housing vouchers.
2. Partnerships with Non-Profit Organizations
Establishing partnerships between PBV and PBRA tenants and lo-
cal non-profit organizations can mitigate the perceived risks associ-
ated with renting to low-income tenants by providing households with
resources that prevent escalation and damage.204 Landlord mitigation
funds may facilitate partnerships by requiring tenants to participate in
case management or offering tenants housing or mediation education
to resolve disputes before landlords face a broken lease and unpaid
rent.205 These supportive services prevent claims to landlord mitiga-
tion funds.206
198. U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 182.
199. Hiler, supra note 182, at 17; U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS,
supra note 182.
200. Hiler, supra note 182, at 9–10; Erin Adler, As Rental Markets Tightens, Agen-
cies Try Mitigation Funds to Lower Risks for Landlords, STAR TRIB. (June 10, 2017),
http://www.startribune.com/as-rental-market-tightens-agencies-try-mitigation-funds-
to-lower-risk-for-landlords/427695823/ [https://perma.cc/UZ29-SANM].
201. Hiler, supra note 182, at 19.
202. U.S. INTERAGENCY COUNCIL ON HOMELESSNESS, supra note 182.
203. Id.; Hiler, supra note 182, at 9–10.
204. Hiler, supra note 182, at 19.
205. Id. at 20.
206. Id. at 19.
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A research study in Texas found that properties implementing evic-
tion-prevention programs saved an average of $38 per unit per year.207
The most effective types of programs include intervention, case man-
agement, and monitoring tenants for early signals of eviction.208 When
landlords facilitate partnerships with non-profit or governmental orga-
nizations, it allows them to have access to these cost-saving programs
without the burden of funding the additional cost of specialized staff
to administer them. Facilitation may be through informal systems,
such as resource guides or referral networks; or more formal systems,
such as mandatory tenant participation requirements.
B. Encouraging Landlord Participation Through
Increased Incentives
Several risks landlords face due to the participation in PBV and
PBRA programs cannot be directly mitigated; however, policies may
be adopted to incentivize landlords to take on these additional risks
by making participation more profitable.
1. Land Use Regulations
Cities can incentivize private industry participation in PBV and
PBRA programs on a local level by adopting inclusionary and incen-
tivized zoning ordinances to offset costs of development and potential
legal costs. Inclusionary zoning is a principle that developed to contra-
dict the exclusionary zoning policies of traditional land use that re-
sulted in increased segregation.209 While inclusionary zoning can have
a variety of goals, its use can be specifically targeted towards increas-
ing the development of affordable housing by providing mechanisms
to offset costs associated with development.210 Over 300 jurisdictions
have enacted inclusionary zoning ordinances, but not all ordinances
are based on the purpose of increasing affordable housing units.211
Cities may adopt mandatory inclusionary zoning ordinances, which
require a specified number of units to be dedicated to affordable
housing.212 However, some states place limitations on whether cities
207. Michael Wilt, The Benefits of Preventing Eviction, TEX. ST. AFFORDABLE
HOUSING CORP. (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.tsahc.org/blog/post/the-benefits-of-pre
venting-eviction [https://perma.cc/VYQ8-4FRL].
208. Id.
209. Jai Keep-Barnes, Inclusionary Zoning as a Taking: A Critical Look at its Abil-
ity to Provide Affordable Housing, 49 URB. LAW. 67, 70 (2017).
210. Fruman Ctr. for Real Est. & Urb. Pol’y & Ctr. for Housing Pol’y, The Effects
of Inclusionary Zoning on Local Housing Markets: Lessons from the San Francisco,
Washington DC and Suburban Boston Areas 3 (Mar. 2008), http://furmancenter.org/
files/publications/IZPolicyBrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R6N-MKYU].
211. Id.
212. Off. of Pol’y Dev. & Res., Inclusionary Zoning and Mixed-Income Communi-
ties (Spring 2013), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/periodicals/em/spring13/highlight3
.html [https://perma.cc/5VHW-A3HD].
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can implement mandatory inclusionary zoning.213 Alternatively, cities
can enact voluntary ordinances to encourage development through in-
centivized zoning or subsidizing affordable housing development.214
Incentives often include density bonuses.215 Density bonuses allow
developers to construct their units at higher density levels than ordi-
narily allowed under the city’s zoning laws. The amount of the density
increase is generally based on the percentage of tenants at a specified
percentage of the Area Median Income (“AMI”).216 This incentive
increases a developer’s potential profit by increasing the number of
tenants housed within the building.217 Opt-out fees may be imple-
mented for developers who elect not to provide affordable housing
but seek the density bonus.218 These funds are then available for allo-
cation to affordable housing efforts.219 In addition to density bonuses,
cities can incentivize the voluntary participation in affordable housing
through expediating city approvals on development and waiving fees
associated with development.220 Profits can also increase through re-
ducing set-backs or increasing floor areas, which would allow develop-
ers to construct buildings closer to boundaries and, thus, increase
rental space.221
A study conducted on inclusionary zoning found that programs
granting density bonuses and exempting smaller projects correlated
with a higher number of affordable units produced within the jurisdic-
tion.222 However, the study cautioned that “even those ordinances
that have produced the most affordable housing units . . . have not
solved the community’s housing challenges.”223 Rather, inclusionary
zoning ordinances should be part of a multidimensional approach to
encourage the development of affordable housing.224
2. Expanding the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
The financing for a real estate acquisition or the construction of af-
fordable housing is highly complex, requiring knowledge of public and
private financing resources.225 The complexities of the Low-Income
213. CITY OF DALL., CITY COUNCIL HOUS. COMM., INCLUSIONARY ZONING (2016).
214. Id.; Off. of Pol’y Dev. & Res., supra note 212.
215. CITY OF DALL., supra note 213.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Off. of Pol’y Dev. & Res., supra note 212.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. DAWN JOURDAN & ERIC J. STRAUSS, PLANNING FOR WICKED PROBLEMS: A
PLANNER’S GUIDE TO LAND USE LAW 72–73 (Taylor & Francis, 1st ed. 2016).
222. Fruman Ctr. for Real Est. & Urb. Pol’y & Ctr. for Housing Pol’y, supra note
210, at 10.
223. Id. at 9.
224. Id.
225. See Ted M. Handel & David C. Nahas, Leveraging the Low-Income Housing
Tax Credits Program, 26-JAN L.A. LAW 23 (2004).
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Housing Tax Credit (“LIHTC”) can prevent participation in the RAD
program.226 However, the perception of investment in affordable
housing is generally not as high-risk due to the large number of house-
holds that are eligible for assistance.227
To encourage developer participation in affordable housing, Con-
gress created the LIHTC, which provides annual tax credits over the
course of ten years.228 LIHTCs have served as a source of equity in
approximately 90% of affordable housing developments, providing
nearly 3 million affordable housing units229 and is considered “the
most successful subsidized housing program to date.”230 To encourage
landlord participation in the PBV and PBRA programs under RAD,
Congress should expand the number of tax credits allocated each year
and establish a minimum for the 4% tax credit to ensure the program
is more predictable.
To qualify for a LIHTC, “20[%] of the units must qualify at or be-
low 50[%] of the Area Median Income (“AMI”) established by HUD,
or 40[%] must qualify at or below 60[%] of AMI.”231 LIHTCs offer
two types of tax credit options.232 Developers constructing housing or
substantially rehabilitating an existing building are eligible for 9% tax
credit for the building’s qualified basis.233 At the end of the ten-year
period, the 9% tax credit results in a credit equal to 70% of the build-
ing’s cost.234 Alternatively, the LIHTC offers a 4% tax credit for the
acquisition of an existing building that will be substantially reno-
vated.235 LIHTCs give developers greater access to funding sources
because the tax credits are attractive to potential investors.236 How-
ever, the acquisition of tax credits is highly competitive.237 Congress
limited the number of LIHTCs available under the 9% tax credit and
requires the distribution of tax credits on a per capita basis.238
In March of 2017, House Representative Patrick Tiberi introduced
the Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2017.239 This bill
would expand the availability of LIHTCs and make “project financing
226. ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 4, at 175.
227. Handel & Nahas, supra note 225, at 24.
228. Id. at 23.
229. NAT’L ASS’N OF HOUS. & REDEVELOPMENT OFFICIALS, EXPAND AFFORDA-
BLE HOUSING PRODUCTION RESOURCES 13 (2017).
230. Weiss, supra note 97, at 525.
231. Handel & Nahas, supra note 225, at 24.




236. Id. at 24.
237. NAT’L ASS’N OF HOUS. & REDEVELOPMENT OFFICIALS, supra note 229.
238. Handel & Nahas, supra note 225, at 24; 26 U.S.C. § 42 (2012).
239. U.S. CONG., H.R. 1661 Affordable Housing Credit Improvement Act of 2017,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1661 [https://perma.cc/U7FN-
82XV] (last visited Feb. 21, 2019).
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more predictable and feasible.”240 RAD conversions are dependent
on the availability of LIHTCs. The RAD program’s first Interim Re-
port analyzed the financing raised by the 185 closed conversions and
found the greatest portion came from private investors in LIHTC eq-
uity, amounting to 39.4% of the financing raised.241 By expanding the
availability and stability of LIHTCs, Congress can expand developers’
access to other private equity sources, thus encouraging greater partic-
ipation in the program.
First, the house bill establishes a minimum for the 4% tax credit.242
While the tax credit received the label of the 4% credit, the actual
percentage a developer receives depends on a formula based on fed-
eral borrowing rates.243 In contrast, Congress imposed a 9% minimum
for the 9% credit.244 This bill would create a similar restriction on the
4% credit, allowing more predictability in the actual tax credit real-
ized.245 In addition to the house bill, an increase in the number of tax
credits allocated under the 9% credit would decrease the competitive-
ness of receiving credits.246 Although LIHTCs cost the government $8
billion annually,247 the program adds over $9 billion into the economy,
which has “generated $3.5 billion in federal, state, and local taxes each
year.”248 Thus, the $8 billion loss is ultimately offset by $3.5 billion.
These steps would allow easier and more predictable access to the eq-
uity needed to participate in the PBV and PBRA programs while ad-
ding economic value to the community.
Expanding the ten-year time-period in which developers must offer
affordable housing under the LIHTC program can also result in an
increased number of affordable housing units. While LIHTCs make
affordable housing more profitable by providing significant subsidies
to developers and investors, the resulting housing units are only re-
stricted by the affordable housing requirements for ten years.249 A de-
veloper receiving a 9% tax credit can ultimately receive a tax
reduction that equals up to 70% of the cost of the development.250 A
poorly constructed building will generally still have a lifespan of at
240. NAT’L ASS’N OF HOUS. AND REDEVELOPMENT OFFICIALS, NAHRO STATE-
MENT FOR THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE HEARING AMERICA’S AFFORDABLE
HOUSING CRISIS: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS 3 (2017).
241. ECONOMETRICA, INC., supra note 4.
242. AFFORDABLE RENTAL HOUSING A.C.T.I.O.N., THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING





247. Weiss, supra note 97, at 524.
248. Robert Dietz, The Economic Impact of the Affordable Housing Credit, EYE
ON HOUS. (July 15, 2014), http://eyeonhousing.org/2014/07/the-economic-impact-of-
the-affordable-housing-credit/ [https://perma.cc/U8UE-NEK3].
249. See Weiss, supra note 97, at 525.
250. Handel & Nahas, supra note 225, at 23.
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least thirty-five years, whereas higher quality buildings have a pro-
jected lifespan of at least seventy years.251 Thus, the ten-year restric-
tion period allows developers to finance a significant portion of their
apartment complex structure through avoiding their full tax liability,
while subsequently allowing the developer to receive full market rent
for at least 70% of the building’s projected lifespan. Landlords partici-
pating in the PBV and PBRA programs must provide units under
these programs for an additional five to ten years over the LIHTC
requirement based on the HAP term.252 Congress could increase par-
ticipation in the PBV and PBRA programs by raising the time period
restriction on properties receiving LIHTCs to bridge the gap between
the time period restriction applicable to LIHTC and the term required
by the HAP contract.
C. Summary of Solutions
Policy makers can encourage landlords to participate in the PBV
and PBRA programs under RAD by implementing the following
programs:
• Establish a landlord mitigation fund that provides property dam-
age coverage resulting from leasing to tenants who receive subsi-
dies through the PBV, PBRA, and HCV programs;
• Facilitate partnerships with non-profit organizations or govern-
mental entities that provide eviction-prevention programs, such
as case management, financial counseling, and emergency rent
assistance;
• Adopt incentive-based zoning ordinances that provide PBV and
PBRA developers with density bonuses, decreased property set-
backs, expediated permit approvals, or fee waivers, and allow
developers to pay an opt-out fee to receive some of these incen-
tives without constructing affordable units in order to fund a
landlord mitigation fund;
• Establish a minimum tax credit rate of 4% for the 4% tax credit
under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit;
• Increase the number of tax credits allowed under the 9% tax
credit under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit; and
• Increase the mandatory ten-year time period requirement in
which LIHTC properties must provide affordable housing.
V. CONCLUSION
The Rental Assistance Demonstration program offers an innovative
solution to the public housing crisis by transferring ownership of pub-
lic housing structures to private developers who will rehabilitate the
structures. The program’s success relies in part on the participation of
251. Kishor Pate, How Long Does A Modern Concrete Building Last?, LINKEDIN
(July 28, 2015), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/how-long-does-modern-concrete-
building-last-amit-enterprises-housing [https://perma.cc/W487-VKRT].
252. See Gramlich, supra note 46, at 4-22.
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private developers or landlords who choose to enter Housing Assis-
tance Payment contracts with the United States Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development and their local Public Housing
Authority. These contracts obligate landlords to dedicate a specified
number of units to the Project-Based Voucher program or the Project-
Based Rental Assistance program. These programs allow tenants who
receive housing assistance to lease the unit. The tenant pays the land-
lord only 30% of the household’s monthly income towards rent, and
the local PHA pays the landlord the difference between the tenant’s
share and the lesser of the area’s median rent or the fair market value
of the unit. While the contract provides sufficient projected income to
the landlord, it comes with several legal risks. These risks include stat-
utory and regulatory created causes of action and penalties, additional
risk through the remedies and obligations established in the contract,
and tenant insolvency. The creation of a landlord mitigation fund to
provide reimbursement for claims based on tenant’s destruction of the
property can mitigate risks associated with tenant insolvency. Addi-
tionally, the facilitation of partnerships between PBV and PBRA te-
nants and local non-profit organizations can mitigate risks associated
with tenant insolvency through providing services and case manage-
ment that decrease the chance of early lease termination, eviction, se-
curity concerns, and property damage.
The creation of incentives can make participation in the PBV and
PBRA programs more financially attractive to landlords. Expanding
the cap on the 9% tax credit and establishing a minimum for the 4%
tax credit under the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit program will
increase the availability and predictability of tax credits to developers.
In turn, this will result in increased availability of private equity fund-
ing. Finally, cities can adopt inclusionary zoning ordinances that man-
date or encourage developers to participate in affordable housing by
requiring developers to dedicate a requisite number of units to afford-
able units, offering density bonuses based on the percentage of units
dedicated to affordable housing, decreasing set-backs, increasing floor
areas, or expediating approvals and fee waivers during development.
Cities can also create opt-out provisions to allow developers to receive
these benefits without dedicating units to affordable housing in order
to finance a landlord mitigation fund or other affordable housing
initiatives.
